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There  is  a  substantial  body  of  evidence  that  documents  cross  section  and
time  series  correlations  between  economic  growth  and  various  economic,  social,
demographic,  and  political  variables.  For  economists  who  want  to  understand  the
growth  process  and  policy  makers  who  want  to  influence  it,  the  basic  challenge  is
to  find  some  way  to  uncover  the  causal  connections  that  explain  these  statistical
regularities.  Fundamentally,  causality  can  be  identified  only  in  situations  where
we  have  evidence  about  the  exogeneity  of  the  variables  that  are  conjectured  to  play
a  causal  role.  By  design  or  by  accident,  we  must  have  something  like  a  classical
experimental  setting  where  a  variable  that  is  conjectured  to  play  a  causal  role
takes  on  values  that  are  independent  of  any  other  variable  and  where  the  subsequent
outcomes  for  other  variables  are  observed.
In  disciplines  like  pharmacology  where  experiments  are  relatively
inexpensive  to  carry  out,  theory  is  not  always  necessary.  If  a  randomized  clinical
trial  shows  that  a  drug  is  safe  and  effective,  it  can  be  used  with  confidence,
whether  or  not  there  is  an  accepted  theoretical  explanation  of  the  underlying
biological  mechanisms.  In  a  discipline  like  economics,  where  experimental  design
is  prohibitively  expensive  and  where  natural  experiments  are  rare,  theory  plays  a
much  more  important  role.  Theory  provides  the  link  between  one  set  of  correlations
that  may  be  of  little  inherent  interest  but  where  the  causal  relationships  are
understood,  and  another  set  of  correlations  where  identifying  the  causal
connections  is  more  important.  It  is  the  tool  that  we  use  to  generalize  results
from  a  familiar  setting,  where  we  have  enough  experience  to  infer  causal
relations,  to  a  less  familiar  setting.
This  paper  briefly  summarizes  some  of  the  known  correlations  between  growth
in  per  capita  income  measured  over  long  time  intervals  and  other  economic
variables,  particularly  those  relating  to  investment  and  international  trade.  It
also  presents  some  regression  evidence  that  extends  the  existing  set  of2
correlations.  Compared  to  earlier  work  on  development,  the  main  contribution  here
is  an  attempt  to  interpret  these  correlations  in  the  context  of  an  aggregate  theory
of  growth  that  explicitly  models  technological  change.  Of  particular  interest  is
the  interpretation  of  the  apparent  correlation  across  countries  between  the  rate
of  technological  change  and  the  rate  of  capital  accumulation.
The  most  important  conclusions  that  emerge  from  this  analysis  are  as
follows:
1)  There  is  little  direct  support  for  the  idea  that  exogenous  increases  in  the
savings  rate  cause  increases  in  the  rate  of  technological  change.  On  the  contrary,
apparently  exogenous  increases  in  the  rate  of  savings  and  investment  seem  to  be
associated  with  lower  rates  of  return  to  capital,  much  as  one  would  expect  in  a
neoclassical  model.
2)  Increases  in  openness  to  international  trade  do  seem  to  cause  increases  in  the
rate  of  technological  change.  Countries  that  are  more  open  have  a  higher  level  of
investment  and  capital  growth,  but  contrary  to  the  finding  noted  above,  this
higher  level  is  not  associated  with  a  fall  in  the  marginal  product  of  capital.
Countries  that  are  expanding  their  degree  of  integration  with  world  markets  seem
to  have  have  a  higher  marginal  product  of  capital.
3)  Intuitively  obvious  measures  like  the  number  of  scientists  and  engineers  also
seem  to  be  related  to  increases  in  the  rate  technological  change  and  therefore  in
the  marginal  product  of  capital.
The  tentative  nature  of  these  conclusions  should  be  clear.  What  this  paper
shows  is  that  there  is  a  theoretical  model  with  the  specified  causal  links  which  is3
consistent  with  the  patterns  of  correlation  found  in  the  data.  There  may  be  other.
theories  that  explain  these  correlations  in  very  different  ways.  At  a  minimum,  the
analysis  here  has  broadened  the  task  that  alternative  other  theories  must  attempt.
In  discussions  of  the  correlation  between  capital  accumulation  and  growth,  it  will
no  longer  be  enough  to  put  forward  an  explanation  for  the  correlation  between  these
two  variables  alone.  An  alternative  theory  must  do  what  the  theory  here  does,
simultaneously  explain  this  correlation  and  other  correlations  with  trade  and
human  capital  data.
No  doubt  other  such  theories  can  and  will  be  put  forward.  However,  the
theory  suggested here seems to  have the additional  strength  that  it  conforms to our
experience  at  the micro or firm level,  where sometfing closer  to  controlled
experiments are feasible  and where  we  therefore  have  a  firmer  grip  on  the  nature  of
causal  connections.  Just  as  informal experience  and formal evidence at  a less
aggregate  level  would suggest,  the thenry  described  here  attributes  an  important
causal  role  for  the  creation  of  new  goods,  especially  new  producer  durables,  in  the
cumulative  process  of  growth  and  technological  change.  It  suggests  that  the  stock
of  inputs  used  in  the  research  and  development  process  influences  the  rate  at  which
new  goods  and  technologies  emerge.  And  it  suggests  that  variables  like  the  degree
of  patent  protection  that  affect  the  returns  to  innovation  will  matter  for  the
aggregate  rate  of  technological  change.  All  of  these  intuitive  obvious
observations  are  markedly  absent  from  most  discussions  of  aggregate  growth,  both
in  the  older  neoclassical  models  and  in  many  of  the  more  recent  models  as  well.
In  a  strict  formal  sense,  the  data  presented  here  do  not  solve  the  problem  of
endogeneity.  At  the  aggregate  level  there  simply  are  no  clearly  exogenous
variables.  The  main  support  for  the  causal  interpretation  suggested  here  comes
from  the  fact  that  the  theory  can  be  applied  at  both  the  aggregate  and  at  a  much
finer  level,  and  that  its  implications  at  the  less  aggregate  level  seem  sensible.*  4
Section  2  describes  the  rationale  for  the  type  of  model  used  here,  an
aggregate,  equilibrium  model.  Section  3  gives  an  informal  description  of  the  the
model  itself.  Section  4  describes  how  the  model  is  implemented  empirically.
Section  5  presents  new  regression  results  using  cross  country  data.  Section  6
summarizes  related  evidence  from  other  studies.  A  final  concluding  section
reiterates  the  main  findings  and  illustrates  their  quantitative  significance.
Section  2:  Theoretical  Framework
The  model  used  in  what  follows  differs  in  two  ways  from  models  that  are
widely  used  in  development.  First,  it  is  explicitly  in  the  tradition  of
equilibrium  models.  Even  though  it  departs  from  the  competitive,  price  taking
assumption  that  has  become  standard  in  equilibrium  models,  it  starts  from  an
explicit  specification  of  preferences,  an  aggregate  technology,  and  an
equilibrium  concept.  As  suggested  in  the  introduction,  the  rationale  for  this
modeling  strategy  is  that  it  offers  the  most  power  for  generalizing  across
different  types  of  evidence  to  reach  conclusions  about  causality.  Models  that
start  from  tLe  assumption  that  there  is  something  unspecified  that  is  different
about  aggregate  level  analysis  that  makes  standard  tools  not  apply  do  not  have  this
property.
Discussions  of  growth  by  early  classical  economists  allowed  for  the
possibility  that  increasing  returns  to  scale  in  manufacturing  were  an  important
factor  in  explaining  the  rapid  growth  of  output  observed  in  this  sector.  Once  the
formal  theory  of  market  structure  and  competition  was  recognized  as  being
applicable  at  the  aggregate  level,  it  became  clear  that  the  assumption  of
increasing  returns  required  other  assumptions  as  well.  Since  most  industries  havemany  firms,  it  must be the  case either  that  there  are  important external  effects  so
that  the  increasing  returns  are  external  to any individual  firm,  as suggested by
Alfred Marshall,  or that  firms  do not sell  gord&  that  are  perfect  substitutes,  as
emphasized by Joan Robinson and Edward  Chamberlin.  These alternatives  have
implications  for  other  observations  about industry  and firm behavior that  can be
compared  with  data.  Thus,  formal  theories  of  market  equilibrium  show  how  evidence
about  industrial  organization  and  firm  behavior  can  be  brought  to  bear  on  the
fundamental  questions  about  growth.  Absent  these  theories,  economists  were  free
to  assume  whatever  they  wanted  about  returns  to  scale.
On  these  grounds,  a  complete,  general  equilibrium  model  is  to  be  preferred.
It  is  much  harder  to  relate  a  model  like  the  Harrod-Domar  model  to  industry  data.
At  the  aggregate  level,  the  reference  standard  for  an  equilibrium  model  is  the
neoclassical  model,  a  model  that  has  fallen  out  of  favor  in  studies  of  development.
In  part,  this  is  because  it  has  little  explanatory  power  in  comparisons  of  growth
rates  across  countries;  most  of  the  action  is  in  the  exogenous  variation  in  the
rate  of  technological  change.  Apparently  because  of  dissatisfaction  with  this
model,  the  modeling  strategy  in  development  has  beeA  to  use  models  that  are  less
restrictive  but  that  therefore  have  much  less  power  to  integrate  evidence  from
many  different  quarters.  Because  they  are  less  restrictive,  Harrod-Domar  models
that  emphasize  fixed  coefficients  for  labor  and  capital  in  the  production  of
output  and  assume  that  a  supply  of  unemployed  labor  is  available,  or
disequilibrium  models  that  focus  on  exogenously  given  differences  in  the  marginal
productivity  of  inputs  in  different  sectors  and  on  the  reallocation  of  resources
across  sectors  offer  richer  and more suggestive  ways  to  summarize  the  data than the
rigid  growth  accounting  framework  of  the  neoclassical  model.  Without  these  less
rigid  models,  it  is  hard  to  motivate  examination  of  a  variable  like  trade  policy  or
to  entertain  the  possibility  that  variation  in  the  rate  of  investment  might  play  a6
causal  role  in  the  growth  process.  However,  these  restrictions  are  specific  to  the
neoclassical  model,  not  to  all  equilibrium  models.  The  next  section  describes  an
equilibrium  model  that  is  much  less  restrictive.
In  addition  to  following  an  equilibrium  strategy,  the  model  here  is
essentially  an  aggregate  model.  No  distinction  is  made  between  major  sectors  like
agriculture  and  manufacturing,  and  the  growth  process  faced  by  less  developed
economies  is  assumed  to  be  qualitatively  the  same  as  that  faced  by  developed
economies.  This  second  choice  is  partly  a  matter  of  convenience  and  simplicity,
but  it  also  reflects  a  judgment  that  it  does  much  less  violence  to  the  data  than  is
commonly  supposed.  It  is  true  that  the  composition  of  demand  changes
systematically  with  the  level  of  income,  but  this  does  not  necessarily  have  strong
implications  for  the  rate  of  growth  of  output  or  prVodictivity.  In  developed
countries,  productivity  growth  or  technological  caange  has  been  as  dramatic  in
agriculture  as  in  manufacturing.  In  the  one  part  of  the  service  sector  where
outputs  can  be  adequately  measured,  telecommunications,  productivity  growth  has
been  equally  impressive.  Moreover  the  authors  of  a  major  synthesis  of  cross
country  studies  of  industrialization  comment:
Although  sectoral  differences  in  productivity  are  significant,  differences
among  countries  are  equally  so.  Total  factor  productivity  growth  tends  to
be  higher  in  all  sectors  in  countries  of  high  growth.  (Chenery,  Robinson,
and  Syrquin,  1986.)
It  is  this  country  specific  element  of  productivity  growth  that  the  model
described  here  seeks  to  address.7
Section  3:  Description  of  the  Model
The  basic  model  used  here  is  drawn  from  Romer  (1988)  . In  many  respects,  it
is  quite  close  to  the  neoclassical  model  with  technological  change.  The  key
difference  is  that  the  dependence  of  technological  change  on  econo.-^  decisions  is
explicitly  modeled.  To  do  this,  it  is  necessary  to  depart  from  the  usual  framework
of  perfect  competition  and  adopt  instead  a  framework  with  differentiated
comodities  and  monopolistic  competition.  Since  differentiated  commodities  imply
an  important  role  for  trade,  the  attempt  to  model  endogenous  technological  change
has  the  unintended  benefit  of  showing  why  trade  policy  may  be  important  for  growth.
The  basic  difficulty  in  introducing  endogenous  technological  change  into
the  neoclassical  model  is  well  known.  Suppose  that  net  national  output  takes  the
form
Y  = F(L,H,K,A)
where  L  is  the  total  stock  of  physical  labor,  H is  the  total  stock  of  trained
human  capital,  K  is  capital,  and  A is  an  indicator  of  the  level  of  the  technology.
L  grows  with  increases  in  the  population  and  the  labor  force  participation  rate.
Since  H  here  is  measured  in  total,  not  average  terms,  it  grows  when  L  does.  It
also  grows  relative  to  L  when  the  level  of  training  or  education  increases.  (Many
formulations  make  L  and  H perfect  substitutes  so  that  they  can  be  added  together
to  get  a  single  measure  of  effective  labor.  This  is  a  special  case  of  the  general
formulation  described  here.)  The  rate  of  growth  of  the  capital  stock  depends  on
savings  behavior,8
K=Y-C =sY,
where  s is  the  aggregate  savings  rate  out  of  net  national  income.
Decisions  about  the  allocation  of  resources  determining  the  rates  of  growth
of  H,  L,  and  K  are  all  made  by  self  interested  individuals.  For  example,
individuals  save  to  earn  a  rate  of  return  on  their  capital  or  invest  in  education  to
earn  a  rate  of  return  on  human  capital.  To  complete  a  description  of  the  evolution
of  the  model,  one  would  like  to  introduce  a  sector  that  explains  why  individuals
make  investment  decisions  thr  cause  A to  grow  as  well.
Formally,  it  is  easy  to  introduce  a  research  and  development  sector  that
produces  A.  Let
Y=  F(A,K,,L,,H 1),  (1)
A  =  29L2,H2)9
with  the  understanding  that  K1+KA  = K,  ...  The  difficulty  for  this  kind  of  model
comes  in  explaining  why  any  self-interested  individual  would  devote  any  resources
to  the  A  producing  sector.  The  crucial  assumption  on F is  that  it  exhibits
constant  returns  to  scale  in  the  arguments  K,  L,  and  H  alone.  The  rationale  for
this  assumption  is  inherent  in  what  we  mean  by  the  echnology.  Since  the
technology  is  intended  to  capture  abstract  knowledge,  production  processes,
designs,  etc.  that  can  be  used  as  many  times  as  desired,  a  simple  replication
argument  suggests  that  by  doubling  K,  L,  and  H  and  exactly  replicating  an
existing  productive  activity,  it  should  be  possible  to  double  output.
If  firms  are  price  takers,  K,  L,  and  R are  paid  their  marginal  products.  By
the  properties  of constant  returns  to  scale  functions,  total  revenue  Y (measured9
in  units  of  output)  will  be  exactly  equal  to  compensation  paid  to  K,  L,  and  H:
y  =B  a  a YX=SF(L,H,K,A)L  + NF(L,H,K,A)  *H  +  pF(L,H,K,A)  -K.
A  competitive  firm  that  pays  anything  at  all  for  the  technology  that  it  uses  will
not  break  even.  Without  some  explanation  for  how  A is  compensated,  there  is  no
way  to  explain  how  the  resources  devoted  to  the  A producing  sector  earn  a  return.
In  a  literal  sense,  the  neoclassical  model  faces  this  difficulty  by  assuming
that  A does  not  receive  any  compensation,  but  grows  nonetheless.  The  stock  of  A
is  like  a  public  good  of  unknown  provenance.  A  somewhat  more  reasonable
interpretation  of  the  model  is  that  A is  a  conventional  public  good  supplied  by
the  government  through  its  support  for  basic  research.  No  doubt,  there  is  some
merit  to  this  view  in  the  post-war  US  economy,  but  its  relevance  for  earlier  eras
and  for  other  countries  is  questionable.  Moreover,  even  in  the  post-war  US,  this
view  does  nothing  to  help  explain  the  large  quantities  of  resources  that  private
firms  devote  to  research  and  development.
To  someone  who  is  innocent  of  economic  theory,  the  resolution  of  this
difficulty  is  obvious.  Firms  that  invest  large  amounts  in  the  research  and
development  activities  leading  up  to  the  introduction  of  a  new  good  do  so  with  the
expectation  of  being  able  to  sell  the  good  for  more  than  its  cost  of  production.
Assuming  a  constant  cost  of  producing  each  unit  of  the  good,  firms  expect  to  be  able
to  charge  a  price  higher  than  marginal  cost.
A  good  example  of  such  a  good  is  a  microprocessor  or  a  piece  of  software  that
has  a  very  large  development cost  but a very low, constant  marginal cost  of
production.  As  the  markets  for  these  goods  shows,  a  large  gap  between  price  and
marginal  cost  can  be  supported  in  an  equilibrium  with  no  restrictions  on  entry.
All  that  is  needed  is  that  the  agent  who  incurs  the  fixed  development  costs  has10
property  rights  over  the  good  so  created,  for  example  through  patent  protection,
copyrights,  or  secrecy.  This  means  that  another  new  good  introduced  by  different
firm  cannot  be  a  perfect  substitute  for  some  existing  good,  so  competition  takes
the  form  of  monopolistic  competition  between  suppliers  of  similar,  but  distinct
goods.
The  way  this  is  captured  in  the  model  described  here  is  to  assume  that  output
of  final  goods  is  a  function  of  labor  L  and  human  capital  H,  but  is  also  a
function  of  a  list  of  differentiated  or  specialized  intermediate  inputs  in
production,  {xi})i'.  To  capture  the  idea  that  there  is  no  ultimate  limit  to  the
potential  for  innovation,  the  list  of  conceivable  inputs  is  assumed  to  be
infinitely  long.
Thus,  output  can  be  written  as  a  function
Y  = G(L,H,{xi}iOi).  (2)
(Subscripts  distinguishing  good  used  in  this  sector  from  total  goods  other  sectors
will  be  reintroduced  below.)  Because  of  the  replication  argument  noted  above,
this  expression  is  assumed  to  be  a  constant  returns  to  scale  function.  Instead  of
appearing  explicitly  as  an  argument,  capital  appears  indirectly  through  the  inputs
xi.  For  example,  x7 could  be  a  dump  truck,  x8 a  lathe,  xg  a  computer.  Each  of
these  specialized  inputs  requires  raw  capital  in  their  production.  Capital  can  be
reintroduced  in  a  reduced  form  expression  as  follows.
Although  there  is  an  infinite  number  of  potential  inputs  that  could  be  used
in  production,  at  any  point  in  time,  the  set  of  available  inputs  xi  is  limited  to
the  set  of  goods  that  have  been  invented  and  introduced.  At  time  t,  let  A(t)
denote  the  upper  bound  of  this  set,  so  intermediate  inputs  i  E (1,  ...  , A(t))  are
in  use  at  time  t.  Let  K(t)  denote  the  total  stock  of  capital  (in  units  of  foregone11
consumption)  that  are  embodied  in  the  stock  of  intermediate  inputs  in  use.  As  a
simplification,  the  list  {xi}  that  is  in  use  at  time  t  can  be  characterized  by
the  two  values  A(t)  and  K(t),  and  output  can  be  written  as
Y  =  G(L,H,X,A).  (3)
Starting  from  the  function  G in  equation  2,  two  key  properties  of  the
reduced  form  function  G  follow  immediately.  First,  G exhibits  constant  returns
to  scale  in  the  arguments  L,  H,  and  K  for  a  fixed  level  of  A  because  doubling  the
quantity  of  all  goods  L,  H,  x1,  ...  ,  xA  that  are  in  use  does  not  imply  any  change
in  the  number  of  goods  in  use  as  measured  by  A.  Secondly,  as  K increases  for  fixed
L  and  H  and  A,  the  marginal  product  of  capital  will  decrease  for  the  same  reason
that  it  decreases  in  the  neoclassical  model.  Increases  in  K  will  be  spread  across
increases  in  the  goods  xi,  and  the  marginal  productivity  of  each  xi  falls  as  the
quantity  increases  relative  to  the  quantities  of  L  and  H.
The  behavior  of  G  as  A  changes  can  be  derived  by  reference  to  Figure  1.
This  plots  output  Y  as  a  function  of  a  representative  intermediate  input  xi  when
all  other  inputs  are  held  constant.  For  simplicity,  assume  that  once  a  good  i  has
been  invented,  designed,  and  introduced  (costs  of  doing  this  to  be  described
below),  units  of  good  i  can  be  produced  from  units  of  capital  and  measured  in  in
these  units.  For  a  fixed  level  of  A,  all  of  the  goods  xi  for  i  =  1,  ...  ,  A  will
be  used  at  a  level  that  equalizes  their  (net  of  depreciation)  marginal  product.
Thus,  input  i  is  used  at  the  level  xi in  the  figure.
When  A increases,  it  creates  a new  investment opportunity  for  capital.
Starting  from a value equal to  0, the  marginal productivity  of a unit  of  the  new
good, and therefore  of capital  invested  in  the  new  good,  will  be  very  high.  Thus,
the  initial  effect  of an increase  in  A is  to  raise  the  marginal  productivity  of12
capital.  Assuming  that  capital  in  place  in  other  inputs  cannot  be  diverted  to
production  of  this  new  input,  output  grows  only  as  new  investment  takes  place.
Thus,  growth  in  A does  not  directly  increase  output,  but  rather  increases  the
marginal  product  of  capital,  and  may  also  induce  a  higher  rate  of  investment.  Once
the  stock  of  capital  fully  adjusts,  an  increase  in  A  will  be  associated  with  an
increase  in  K such  that  the  marginal  product  of  capital  remains  constant.
Literally,  the  model  here  equates  increases  in  the  technology  with  increases
in  the  number  of  productive  inputs  in  the  economy.  An  example  of  an  improvement  in
the  technology  would  therefore  be  the  introduction  of  a  new  input  like  a
numerically  controlled  lathe.  More  generally,  A can  be  thought  of  as  an  index  of
the  creation  of  new  investment  opportunities.
In  a  closed  economy,  growth  in  the  technology  as  measured  by  A  occurs
through  research  and  development.  Suppose  that  the  final  output  sector  is
designated  sector  one,  so  that  the  expression  for  output  is
Y  = G(LI,PI,{Xi}ii)  (4)
Output of new  designs  and goods can be written  formally  as
A = R(L2 ,H2,{x 2 i}i1).  (5)
The adding up constraint  for  the  economy  is  that  the  sum  of  input  usage  in  the  two
sectors  equal the  total  supply,  L 1+L 2 = L, xli+x2 x, etc.  Using  the
simplification  from above that  the  list  {xi}  can be summarized  by  the  number  of
non-zero components A and by the total  amount  of capital  embodied in these  goods
K, these  equations  can written  in reduced form13
Y  = G(L 1,l 1,K 1,A), 
. - ~~~~~~~~~~~(6)
A=  R(L 2,H2 ,K2,A).
Note  that  the  level  of  K is  split  between  the  two  sectors,  but  the  level  of  A is
the  same.  If  A increases  because  personal  computers  are  introduced,  they  can  be
used  either  in  research  or  in  final  output  production.  K1 and  K2 will  increase
depending  on  the  number  of  PCs  used  in  each  sector,  but  the  basic  good  is  available
for  use  in  both.
As  always,  capital  accumulation  depends  on  savings,
K  =  Y-C  =sY.  (7)
For  fixed  L,  H,  and  A,  a  fixed  savings  rate  leads  to  falling  a  marginal
productivity  of  capital  and  a  rate  of  growth  that  approaches  0 just  as  it  does  in
the  neoclassical  model.  Even  if  K and  H  grow  together,  fixed  L  will  ultimately
imply  slowing  growth  and  diminishing  marginal  productivity  to  accumulation  of  K
and  H  together.  The  view  captured  in  this  model  is  that  if  growth  were  based
solely  on  increases  in  the  level  of  training  and  experience  with  a  fixed  set  of
tools  and  increases  in  the  per  capita  quantity  of  these  tools,  rates  of  return  to
investment  in  additional  copies  of  the  existing  tools  and  in  more  training  with
these  tools  would  fall  rapidly.  (Think  of  holding  the  set  of  tools  used  in  the
19'th  century  constant  and  increase  training  and  the  number  of  tools  per  capita.)
Ultimately,  growth  in  per  capita  income  must  be  driven  by  increases  in  the
technology,  as  represented  here  by  increases  in  the  set  of  tools,  or  intermediate
inputs  that  can  be  used  in  production.
From  this  perspective,  the  long  run  prospects  for  growth  in  a  closed  economy14
are  ultimately  determined  by  the  resources  that  are  allocated  to  the  sector  that
produces  the  new  intermediate  inputs  or  tools.  This  allocation  is  determined  by
the  interaction  of  the  following  effects.  To  produce  a  new  tool  requires  a  design,
that  is,  a  one  unit  increase  in  the  quantity  A.  This  is  accomplished  by  devoting
resources  to  the production  function  R  or  R in equations  5 and 6.  The crucial
observation  about this  kind of cost  is  that  it  does not contribute  to the  marginal
cost  of producing units  of the good.  Once  this  fixed  cost  has been incurred,  there
is  a  separate  constant  marginal  cost  of  producing  units  of  the  tool  or  input.
For  simplicity,  it  is  sufficient  to  imagine  that  each  individual  unit  of  the
new  tool  requires  a  fixed  quantity  of  capital.  Since  capital  is  accumulated  as
foregone  output,  this  is  equivalent  to  assuming  that  the  physical  units  of  the
intermediate  input  are  produced  according  to  the  same  technology as final  output.
Output of the  intermediates  goes up as productive  inputs  are  shifted  in constant
proportions  out of final  goods production  and into  production  of intermediate
inputs.
By  assumption,  each  new  tool  xi  is  introduced  by  a  different  firm  i.
Because  it  is  the  unique  supplier  of  the  tool  i,  firm  i  can  charge  the  monopoly
price  for  its  output,  a  price  that  is  higher  than  the  marginal  cost  of  production.
This  creates  the  mechanism  missing  from  the  neoclassical  model  that  enables  a
private  firm  to  pay  for  increases  in  the  stock  of  A.  The  flow  of  income  generated
by  a  price  that  is  higher  than  marginal  cost  constitutes  the  return  to  the  creation
of  a  new  good.
Equilibrium  in  this  model  occurs  when  each  of  the  firms  i=1,  ...  ,  A  and  all
of  the  potential  new  entrants  to  be  firm  A+1,  A+2,  ...  earn  zero  profit  in  an
intertemporal  sense.  If  PA  denotes  the  implicit  cost  of  producing  the  next
design,  in  equilibrium,  PA  must  be  equal  to  the  present  value  of  this  flow  of  net
revenue  arising  from  monopoly  pricing.15
It  is  now  clear  what  determines  the  allocation  of  resources  between  the
productive  sector  and  the  research  and  development  sectors  in  this  economy.  If  PA
is  equal  to  the  present  value,  measured  in  units  of  output  goods,  of  the  stream  of
monopoly  profits  associated  with  a  new  good,  inputs  like  '.,  R, and  K  will  be
allocated  to  equai  ize  their  value  marginal  products  in  the  two  sectors:
k6(L 1,H 1,K,A)  = PA-  &  (L 2,H 29K 2,A),
i  (L,H 1,K 1,A)  =PA-  W  (L 2,H 2,K 2,A)  (8)
These  equations  determine  the  levels  of  inputs  in  R,  and  thereby  determine  the
rate  of  growth  of  A.  As  in  the  neoclassical  model,  for  any  fixed  level  of  savings,
the  rate  of  growth  of  A ultimately  determines  the  rate  of  growth  of  output.
One  immediate,  and  intuitively  obvious  implication  of  this  model  of  growth
is  that  in  a  closed  economy,  any  intervention  that  reduces  the  value  PA  will
reduce  the  resources  devoted  to  R,  and  therefore  reduce  long  run  growth.  Some  kind
of  protection  for  intellectual  property  rights  that  can  prevent  ex  post
competition  between  an  innovating  firm  and  knock  off  firms  that  incur  only  the
production  costs  is  essential  for  PA  to  be  greater  than  zero.  Explicit  or
implicit  taxes  on  innovating  firms,  even  taxes  that  appear  ex  post  to  be  pure
profits  taxes,  will  reduce  PA  and  thereby  reduce  growth.  Anecdotal  evidence
suggests  that  implicit  taxes,  especially  those  related  to  entry,  may  be  very  high
compared  to  explicit  taxes.  (See  for  example  the  estimates  from  de  Soto,  1989,  on
the  regulatory  and  bureaucratic  cost  of  starting  even  the  simplest  firm  in  Peru.)
A  less  obvious  implication  concerns  the  effects  of  increases  in  the  total
quantities  of  the  inputs  R, L, and  K.  Romer  (1988)  shows  that  in  a  case  where  the
research  sector  is  assumed  to  be  human  capital  intensive  relative  to  the16
production  sector,  (specifically,  where  raw  labor  L  is  of  negligible  important  in
research  compared to human  capital  H), an  increase  in  the  total  stock  of  human
capital  causes a higher fraction  of human  capital  to be devoted to  the research
sector.  Thus, increases  in  H lead to  increases  in  output  not  only  through  its
direct  role  in  production  of  Y  as  captured  in  growth  accounting  exercises,  but
also  through  its  indirect  effect  on  the  rate  of  growth  of  A,  an  effect  that  would
show  up  in  the  accounting  exercise  as  a  positive  relation  between  total  level  of  H
and  the  size  of  the  growth  residual.
Less  clear  cut  is  the  effect  of  increases  in  L  or  of  the  savings  rate  on  the
rate  of  growth.  Romer  (1988)  solves  the  model  for  a  special  case  that  relies  on
unit  elasticities  of  substitution  throughout  the  production  sector.  In  this  case,
neither  an  increase  in  L,  nor  an  increase  in  the  savings  rate  causes  an  increase  in
the  growth  of  A.  They  do  increase  the  level  of  output  for  any  fixed  A.  Thus,  as  in
the  neoclassical  model,  these  variables  have  level  effects  but  not  growth  rate
effects.  Using  more  general  functional  forms,  it  is  clear  that  changes  in  these
variables  can  affect  growth  either  positively  or  negatively.  For  example,  in  the
case  where  H  and  L  are  complements  in  producing  final  output  and  where  final
output  production  is  more  labor  intensive  than  the  sector  producing  A,  an  increase
in  L,  holding  H  constant,  leads  to  a  decrease  in  the  rate  of  growth.  No  direct
evidence  on  this  point  is  presented  here,  but  this  case  would  correpond  to  the
general  impression  in  the  development  literature  that  inr.reases  in  the  work  force
do  not  have  as  large  an  effect  on  output  as  a  growth  accounting  exercise  would
suggest.  Conversely,  periods  of  labor  scarcity  may  generate  relatively  high  rates
of growth of technology and productivity  as has often  been suggested  in historical
analyses.  The  argument  here  is  that  they  can  induce  reductions  in  the  rate  of
growth  of  the  technology.  Evidence  that  this  may  also  have  been  a  factor  in  the
long  run  behavior  of  productivity  movements  in  the  US  is  presented  in  Romer  (1987).17
The  other  possibility  that  can  arise  if  more  gener,l  functional  forms  are
used  is  that  an  increase  in  the  savings  rate  could  induce  changes  in  the  price  PA
that  could  induce  increases  in  the  rate  of  growth  of  A.  In  this  case,  contrary  to
thc  result  from  the  neoclassical  model,  an  increase  in  savings  could  have  a
permanent  growth  effect  in  addition  to  the  conventional  level  effect.
The  model  has  very  strong  implications  for  the  beneficial  effects  of  free
trade.  This  is  partly  to  be  expected  from  the  existing  work  on  trade  with
monopolistic  competition  in  consumer  goods.  However,  the  emphasis  here  on
differentiated  intermediate  inputs  in  production  generates  effects  that  show  up  in
increases  in  measured  GDP,  whereas  much  of  the  effect  of  increased  trade  in
differentiated  consumption  goods  shows  up  in  welfare  effects  that  are  not
measured.  (Differentiated  consumption  goods  can  be  added  to  the  present  model
with  little  change  in  its  predictions  about  growth.)
The  main  effect  from  integration  with  world  markets  comes  from  the  fact  that
it  is  inefficient  to  incur  a  fixed  design  or  research  and  development  cost  for  a
specific  good  more  than  once.  Suppose  that  there  were  two  identical  closed
economies,  each  devoting  the  same  level  of  resources  to  the  creation  of  the  same
new  goods  at  the  rate  gA.  Suppose  now  that  these  countries  were  to  engage  in  trade
in  newly  created  intermediate  goods.  Suppose  that  the  first  country  develops  only
the  new  goods  with  an  odd  index  i,  and  the  second  country  develops  the  new  goods
with  an  even  index.  Without  changing  in  any  way  the  allocation  of  resources
between  production  on  the  one  hand  and  new  good  development  on  the  other,  this  will
double  the  worldwide  rate  of  growth  of  A and  the  worldwide  rate  of  growth  of  final
output.
This  observation  offers  a  clear  interpretation  of  why  import  substitution
strategies  are  dominated  by  export  promotion.  With  respect  to  the  intermediates
modeled  here,  import  substitution  is  a  strategy  of  local  design  and  manufacturing18
of  goods  that  are  available  in  other  countries,  a  movement  toward  the  closed
economy  equilibrium  described  above.  By  reproducing  all  the  elements  of  A that
are  used  domestically,  this  strategy  cuts  off  a  small  country  from  many  of  the
benefits  of  worldwide  growth  in  the  variety  of  goods  represented  by  worldwide
growth  in  A.  The  alternative  strategy,  export  (and  import!)  promotion,  involves  a
decision  to  design  new  goods,  thereby  increasing  the  worldwide  stock  of  A,  and  to
exchange  the  new  locally  produced  goods  for  different  goods  produced  elsewhere.
One  qualification  on  the  usual  presumption  in  favor  of  free  trad.e  is  that  the
arguments  here  pertain  only  to  intermediate  goods  in  production.  The  model
suggests  that  restricting  the  range  of  producer  durables  that  can  be  used  by  firms
to  those  few  that  are  locally  produced  has  strong  negative  implications  for  growth
of  GDP,  but  restricting  the  range  of  consumer  durables  that  are  available  may  not.
It  presumably  will  have  negative  effects  on  the  level  of  welfare,  but  not
necessarily  on  measured  rates  of  GDP  growth.
The  model  also  suggests  that  the  threat  perceived  by  less  developed
countries  in  their  trade  with  producers  of  sophisticated  goods  may  not  be  real.
The  implication  of  the  model  is  that  for  final  goods  production,  the  real  advantage
lies  in  being  able  to  buy  a  new  good  like  a  personal  computer,  not  in  being  able  to
design  it  or  produce  it.  Consider  once  again  Figure  1,  and  interpret  it  as  output
of  final  goods  as  a  function  of  the  a  new  good  like  a  computer.  To  make  the  example
as  sharp  as  possible,  suppose  that  this  country  has  no  capacity  for  the  design  of
new  goods  (that  is  for  the  creation  of  A)  and  saves  none  of  its  income.  All  of  its
L  and  H  are  used  in  the  production  of  final  goods.  All  of  the  intermediate  inputs
are  imported,  paid  for  with  exports  of  the  final  goods.
Figure  1  shows  what  the  effect  is  of  trade  in  this  new  intermediate.  In  terms
of  final  output,  the  rental  price  of  the  new  input  will  be  ri.  In  the  small
country,  the  new  inputs  will  be  used  at  the  level  xi  such  that  the  slope  of  Y as  a19
function  of  xi  is  equal  to  ri.  If  the  small  country  allows  imports  of  the  new
good,  it  leads  to  an  increase  in  final  goods  output  equal  to  Y(Ri)  that  is
achieved  at  a  cost  rixi  <  Y(Ri).  Trade  in  this  new  good  is  very  different  from
trade  in  an  existing  good.  At  the  margin,  an  additional  unit  of  some  traded  good
has  an  effect  on  output  that  is  just  equal  to  its  price.  Because  output  goes  up  by
more  than  the  payment  for  the  new  factor,  payments  to  the  existing  factors  L  and  H
will  increase.  The  surplus  associated  with  the  creation  of  a  new  intermediate
input  in  production  accrues  to  the  other  inputs  that  are  used  in  combination  with
it.
Worldwide,  this  surplus  represents  the  growth  accounting  residual,  the  part
of  growth  in  output  that  cannot  be  explained  in  terms  of  increases  in  the  market
value  of  inputs.  In  the  small  country  (as  in  the  rest  of  the  world),  this  surplus
will  show  up  through  increased  marginal  productivity  and  compe!nsation  for  the
inputs  L  and  H.  Initially,  the  new  opportunity  represented  by  A increases  the
marginal  productivity  of  capital,  but  eventually,  the  stock  of  capital  responds
and  drives  the  rate  of  return  back  to  its  equilibrium  level.
The  trade  effect  described  so  far  arises  from  the  fact  that  for  an  open
economy,  the  relevant  stock  of  A is  the  worldwide  stock,  not  the  local  stock.  A
second,  more  subtle,  effect  is  present  as  well.  The  relevant  stock  of  human
capital  is  also  the  world  wide  stock,  not  the  local  stock.  Since  the  fraction  of
human  capital  devoted  to  research  is  an  increasing  function  of  the  total  stock  of
H,  a  small  country  that  opens  itself  to  trade  will  not  only  receive  the  benefits  of
growth  in  A  in  the  rest  of  the  world.  It  will  also  devote  more  resources  to  the  A
producing  sector  and  produce  a  higher  domestic  rate  of  growth  of  A.
4.  Empirical  specification20
Testing  the  implications  of  the  model  in  cross  country  data  is  complicated
by  the  fact  that  measures  of  most  of  the  variables  of  interest  are  not  available.
Direct  measures  on  the  rate  of  growth  of  capital  are  avaiilable  for  relatively  few
countries.  For  large  cross  country  comparisons,  one  must  rely  instead  on  measures
of  investment  as  a  share  of  GDP.  The  distinction  between  being  in  or  out  of  the
labor  force  is  less  sharp  in  poorer  countries,  especially  ones  where  agriculture
plays  an  important  role.  No  direct  measures  of  A or  its  rate  of  growth  are
available.
The  available  data  can  be  used  as  follows.  For  any  variable  X,  let
d=  ln(X)  denote  the  time  derivative  of  the  natural  logarithm  of  the  variable  and
let  f  =l(  denote  the  elasticity  of  G  with  respect  to  X.  Logarithmic
differentiation  yields  the  usual  growth  accounting  expression,
= eLL+eHH+eKK+cAA.  (9)
Using  the  fact  that  Pt  =  I  - AK,  where  I  denotes  investment  and  6  is  the
depreciation  rate,  this  can  be  written  as
Y'  =  eLL  +  HH  + ws '-cK 6+ CAA.  (10)
Let  y=Y/L  denotes  output  per  worker.  Then  because  cL+cH+fK  are  assumed  to  sum  to
1,  we  can  write
y =-  kL + cH(H-L)  +  R  y  K6+  EAA.  (11)
Because  A is  not  observed,  its  effects  can  be  detected  only  indirectly21
through  its  effects  on the  marginal  product  of  capital  OG  and through  its  effects
I~~~
on  the  rate  of  investment  I.  Suppose  first  that  there  is  a  permanently  higher  rate
of growth of  A in  one country compared  to another,  and  suppose  that  savings
behavior adjusts  so  that  the  rate  of  return  on  capital  is  the  same  in  the  two
countries.  Assume  that  A is measured so that  interest  rates  stay  constant  when
the opportunities  for  investment  A and the stock of capital  K grow at the  same
rate.  Assume  as well that  output  is approximately  log linear  so that  the  marginal
product of capital  is proportional  to  the ratio  of  Y to  K.  (An example with these
property  is  worked  out  in  Romer,  1989.)  Since  K is  proportional  to  A,  and  Y/K  is
constant,  we  can  write,
A=K=X-6=  Y  - 6-.  (12)
Thus,  in  this  long  run  sense,  variation  in  A  will  show  up  as  variation  in  I  that
occurs  with  no  variation  in  the  marginal  product  of  OG.  that  is,  with  no  variation
in the  coefficient  on  I  in equation  11.
Thus,  variation  across  countries  in  A  that  is  of  long  eough  duration  that
the  economy  is  able  to  adjust  to  keep  interest  rates  constant  w.  11  be  collinear
with  variation  in  the  share  of  investment  in  GDP.  In  a  regression  equation  that
included  I,  this  variable  would  pick  up  all  of  the  effect  of  the  variation  in  A.
Consider  now  variation  in  A  that  does  not  induce  completely  offsetting
variation  in  I  over  the  time  interval  during  which  data  are  collected.  In  this
case,  one  would  expect  to  find  that  an  increase  in the rate  of growth of  A is
associated  with an increase  in the rate  of growth of per capita  output,  even  after
I taking  account  of  the  effect  of  r  One  would  also  find  that  the  increase  in  A
relative  to  K  was  associated  with  an  increase  in  the  marginal  product  of  capital.22
Suppose  then  that  z is  a  variable  that  is  thought  to  be  a  proxy  for  variation  in  A,
and  that  z is  not  correlated  with  variation  in  y.  Then  one  could  estimate  a
regression  equation  of  the  form
y  = c 1+C 2L  +  c 3(H-L)  +  (c 4+c 5z)  y +  c6z.  (13)
This  is  the  basic  equation  that  is  estimated  in  the  next  section.  Most  of  the
emphasis  is  on  variables  that  play  the  role  of  z.
In  practice,  if  there  is  variation  in  A  across  over  time,  there  is  reason  to
expect  that  the  process  of  convergence  to  equilibrium  levels  of  interest  rates
would  be  slow.  Neither  aggregate  time  series  evidence  and  nor  panel  data  on
individuals  suggests  that  there  is  a  large  interest  elasticity  ox  savings,  yet
most  of  the  adjustment  of  savings  in  response  to  new  investment  opportunities  must
take  place  domestically.  In  terms  of  quantities,  international  capital  flows  tend
to  be  rather  small.  (Feldstein  and  Horioka,  1980).  In  terms  of  prices,  real
interest  rates  seem  to  diverge  appreciably  even  between  the  advanced  economies
that  presumably  are  most  closely  linked.  (See  for  example  Miskin,  1984.)  Thus,  it
is  not  unreasonable  to  expect  to  find  cases  where  growth  in  A  outstrips  growth  in
K,  even  over  the  25  year  horizon  considered  in  the  data  examined  here.
The  last  effect  one  might  hope  to  identify  with  these  data  is  some  indication
about  whehter  exogenously  higher  levels  of  I  are  associated  with  a  lower  marginal
product  of  capital.  In  increases  in  the  savings  rate  do  not  induce  increases  in  the
rate  of  growth  of  A,  exogenous  variation  in  I  has the  same  effects  here that  it
has in  the  neoclassical  model.  It  causes  offsetting  variation  in  the  marginal
product  of  capital.  If  the  interval  of  time  is  long  enough  to  ensure  that  the
capital  output  ratio  has  converges  to  its  steady  state  value,  the  offset  is
complete,  and  variation  in  y  is  not  associated  with  any  change  in  y.  If  the23
variable  z in  equation  13  is  one  that  causes  variation  in  savings  and  investment
without  causing  any  change  in  A,  one  would  expect  to  estimate  a  coefficient  c5
that  was  negative.
5  Results  from estimation
Table  1 gives  definitions  of variables  used in what follows.  Table 2 gives
summary  statistics  for  these  variables.  The  set  of  variables  that  cover  the
largest  set  of  countries  are  those  for  basic  national  income  accounts  concepts  of
GDP,  the  share  i = I/Y  of  investment  (both  private  and government)  in CDP,  and the
share of noninvestment spending by the government.  Data for these  variables  for
112 countries  from 1960 to  1985  are  taken  from Summers  and Reston (1988).  These
data have the advantage that  they are  corrected  for  deviations  from purchasing
parity,  so that  comparisons of per capita  income  are  more  meaningful than
comparisons made  in terms of official  exchange rates.  Trade data on exports  and
ipports  covering  this  same  period are  available  from  the  World  Bank  for  90 of these
original  112  countries.  Most  of  the  subsequent  analysis  is  done  with  this  set  of
countries.  Finally,  data  on  numbers  of  scientists  and  engineers  are  available  for
a  subset  of  22  of  these  countries.
Table  3  shows  the  basic  finding  for  these  data  that  has  been  confirmed  in
many  different  data  sets  by  many  different  authors.  If  variables  are  measured  over
long  time  periods,  the  share  of  investment  in  GDP  is closely  related  to  the  rate  of
growth  of  GDP.  By  itself,  it  explains  34%  of  the  cross  country  variance  in  growth
rates.  This  finding  suggests  that  the  result  for  the  developed  countries  (noted
for  example  in  Romer  1987)  carries  over  to  a  broad  sample  of  countries  weighted
towards  less  developed  countries.  Growth  in  output  and  in  capital  are  both24
correlated  with  growth  in  technological  change.
The  theory  outlined  above  offers  two  suggestions  about  how  to  untangle
causality  in  this  correlation.  It  suggests  that  cross  country  variation  in
openness  to  international  trade  and  in  the  amount  of  scientific  human  capital
should  cause  variation  in  the  rate  of  technological  change.  If  these  variables  are
treated  as  exogenous,  then  this  gives  a  source  of  exogenous  variation  in  A  that
can  be  exploited.  As  suggested  above,  in  the  long  run,  variation  in  A should  show
up  ultimately  through  variation  in  the  investment  share.  Table  4 presents  the
results  of  attempts  to  link  trade,  scientists,  and  any  of  the  other  vCriables
variables  used  here,  with  the  rate  of  investment.
Of  all  the  variables  considered  here,  only  two  have  any  explanatory  power
for  the  investment  share,  the  average  share  of  exports  in  GDP  and  the  average  level
of  real  income,  both  measured  over  the  full  25  year  period  from  1960  to  1985.
Neither  the  change  in  the  export  share  over  this  period,  nor  either  the  levels  or
rates  of  change  of  the  scientific  variables  have  any  explanatory  power  in  this
regression.  Nor  do  any  of  the  other  variables  that  do  have  explanatory  power  for
the  rate  of  growth,  the  dummy  variables  for  Africa  and  Latin  America  and  the  share
of government in GDP,  have  any  explanatory  power  for  the  share of investment.
The interpretation  offered  here for the  finding  that  of all  the  potential
influences  on  technological  change,  only  the  average  level  o;  exports  influences
the  average  level  of  investment  is  that  it  is  the  only  effect  of  long  enough
duration  to  have  influenced  the  rate  of  investment  averaged  over  25  years.
The  finding  that  the  investment  share  is  strongly  related  to  the  level  of
income,  or  more  broadly  to  the  general  level  of  development,  is  not  predicted  Sy
the  theory.  In  particular,  there  is  no  reason  to  expect  that  a  higher  level  of
development  is  correlated  with  a  higher  rate  of  technological  change.  On  the
contrary,  one  would  expect  just  the  opposite  since  less  developed  countries  can25
catch  up  with  the  level  of  technology  in  developed  countries.  Presumably,  this
relation  reflects  something  about  institutions  or  preferences  that  varies
systematically  with  the  level  of  development  and  leads  to  a  level  of  investment
that  is  higher  for  reasons  that  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  rate  of  technological
change.
The  results  from  Table  4 are  most  striking  in  comparison  with  those  from
Table  5.  This  represents  an  attempt  to  estimate  equation  13  with  a  variety  of
different  variables  playing  the  role  of  z.  The  first  finding  is  that  the  variable
AVG_EX,  the  average  level  of  export,  that  is  significant  for  explaining  the
investment  share  i,  does  not  appear  in  this  table  because  it  has  no  explanatory
power  for  the  growth  rate  in  an  equation  that  includs  the  investsent  share.  This  is
true  whether  it  is  entered  directly  in  the  equation  or  as  an  interaction  term  with
i;  it  neither  increases  the  growth  rate  directly  nor  increases  the  marginal
product  of  capital.  Thus,  the  combined  finding  from  the  two  tables  is  that
openness,  as  measured  by  the  average  level  of  exports,  increases  the  rate  of
investment  without  decreasing  the  marginal  productivity  of  capital.  This  is
consistent  with  the  view  that  persistent  openness  increases  the  rate  of  growth  of
A  and  the  rate  of  investment.
The  finding  for  the  level  of  income,  AVG_Y  is  just  the  opposite.  Increases
in  i  caused  by  increases  in  AVG_Y  seem  to  be  strongly  negatively  related  to  the
average  level  of  income.  If  this  variation  in  i  can  be  treated  as  exogenous
relative  to  the  rate  of  technological  change,  then  this  finding  is  consistent  with
a  neoclassical  view  of  the  world,  and  is  inconsistent  with  the  view  that  increases
in  the  stock  of  capital  by  themselves  can  cause  increases  in  the  rate  of
technological  change  large  enough  to  keep  the  marginal  product  of  capital
constant.
In  fact,  for  the  richest  countries,  the  findings  suggest  that  the  absence  of26
any  variation  between  i  and  the  growth  of  income,  as  the  neoclassical  model  would
suggest.  The  coefficient  on  i  is  .22,  suggesting  that  an  increase  of  i  from  10%
to  207.  would  lead  to  an  increase  in  the  growth  rate  of  2.2%  'or  the  poorest
countries  with  a  value  of  AVG_Y  close  to  0.  Since  AVG_Y  varies  from  $300  to
$10,000,  the  coefficient  of  -3.2  *  10 5 suggests  that  the  implied  coefficients  for
the  richest  countries  in  the  world  are  close  to  0 or  slightly  negative.
Several  other  studies  have  shown  that  there  is  a  negative  relationship
between  some  measure  of  the  level  of  development  and  the  rate  of  growth  in  an
equation  like  this.  (See  for  example  Barro,  1989a,b.)  Table  5  shows  clearly  that
the  negative  dependence  arises  through  its  effect  on  the  marginal  product  of
capital.  The  coefficient  on  AVG  Y by  itself  is  positive  but  not  significant.
The  fact  that  this  equation  distinguishes  between  the  role  that  AVGYY  plays
as  in  an  interaction  term  with  i  and  the  direct  role  it  plays  in  explaining  growth
is  something  of  a  surprise.  For  all  of  the  other  variables  considered  here,
collinearity  between  the  level  term  and  the  interaction  term  with  i  makes  it
impossible  to  discriminate  between  the  two  roles.  In  these  other  cases,  the
variables  are  jointly  significant,  but  their  separate  effects  cannot  be
distinguished.
The  change  in  the  share  of  exports  is  one  such  variable.  Overall,  it  is
positively  related  to  growth,  but  it  is  impossible  to  distinguish  the  extent  to
which  this  takes  place  through  an  interaction  with  i  and  the  extent  that  it  arises
from  a  direct  positive  effect  on  growth.  The  regression  reported  here  lets  this
effect  enter  through  an  estimated  effect  on  the  marginal  product  of  capital.  The
somewhat  arbitrary  convention  followed  here  for  variables  other  than  AVG_Y  is  to
let  variables  that  the  theory  suggests  should  influence  the  rate  of  growth  of  A
enter  as  interaction  terms.  This  makes  the  estimated  magnitudes  comparable,
stated  in  terms  of  effects  on  the  marginal  product  of  capital.  The  other  variables27
not  suggested  by  the  theory  are  entered  into  the  regression  on  their  own.
The finding  that  export growth is  correlated  with higher growth of output
and/or a higher  marginal product of capital  is consistent  with the  view that  the
change in the  export  share between 1960-64 and 1981-85 induces an increase  in the
rate  of growth of  A that  is  not fully  compensated  for by an increase  in  i.  As
noted in the discussion  of Table 4, EX DIFF  does  not have any explanatory  power  for
i.  The theory  suggests  that  it  should induce an increase  in  A.  In this  case,  the
theory suggests  that  the  relatively  rapid  increase  in  A compared  to  K should
causes the marginal product of capital  to go up and  should cause the rate  of growth
to  go  up  as  well.
The  dummy  variables  for  Latin  America  and  Africa  are  entered  as  a  kind  of
diagnostic  check.  They  have  been  found  to  be  significant  in  other  regressions  of
this  kind,  (Barro  1989a),  and  they  remain  so here.  They are  indications  that  there
is  something  that  the  theory  is  missing  or  that  is  not  being  measured.  Entered  on
their  own,  they  suggest  that  growth  will  be  slower  by  1.3%  per  year  for  countries
in  these  regions  after  holding  constant  all  the  other  variables  here.  When  they
are  entered  as  interaction  terms  with  investment,  they  suggest  that  the  marginal
product  of  capital  is  lower  by  8-107.  in  these  regions  (e.g.  the  coefficient  on  i
will  be  smaller  by .08  to  .10..)
The  last  variable,  government  spending,  is  a  possible  indirect  measure  of
distortions  in  the  economy.  First,  government  spending  must  ultimately  be
financed,  so  higher  spending  should  be  associated  with  higher  direct  taxes.  As  was
noted  above,  government  spending  could  also  be  associated  with  high  implicit  taxes
on  firms  through  regulation,  so  increased  spending  may  signal  distortions  other
than  those  impli.od  by  the  taxes  needed  to  fund  the  spending.  The  estimated  effect
here  is  significantly  negative,  and  not  small.  An  increase  in  the  share  of
government  from  10%  to  20%  cause  a  reduction  in  the  growth  rate  of  about  17  per28
year.
The interaction  term between the  increase  in the  share of exports  and  i  is
statistically  significant,  but  its  magnitude is not large.  One  concern about this
variable  is  that  there  could  be  a  great  deal  of  variation  in  the  export  share  that
has  little  to  do  with  the  mechanisms  described  by  the  theory.  There  is  also  concern
about  possible  endogeneity.  It  is  quite  possible  that  high  income  growth  fuels
high  growth  in  trade  rather  that  vice  versa.  Table  6  reports  an  attempt  to  gauge
the  importance  of  these  two  possible  effects.  It  reports  a  two  stage  least  squares
regression  that  uses  independent  indicators  of  openness  as  instruments  for
EX_DIFF.  These  instruments  include  membership  in  a  trade  union  for  developed
countries  (EEC  and  EFTA)  and  a  set  of  indicators  for  openness  of  less  developed
countries  reported  in  the  1987  World  Development  report.  The  first  stage
regression  of  EX_DIFF  on  these  instruments  is  sensibly  behaved.  The  Rf  is
around  .3.  EEC  countries  had  greater  growth in the  export  share  than  did  EFTA
countries,  and  the  ranking  of  the  openness  given  by  the  World  Bank  corresponds  with
that  in  the  regression.
Whether  EX_DIFF  is  entered  on  its  own  or  as  an  interaction  term  in  the
reported  result,  the  effect  of  using  two  stage  least  squares  is  to  increase  the
magnitude  of  its  coefficient  by  3  or  4  fold.  Now,  a  increase  in  the  share  of
exports  of  10%  (e.g.  from  107  to  20%)  causes  an  increase  in  the  marginal  product  of
capital  of  about  a  4%  (e.g.  from  10%  to  14%.)  The  coefficient  on  the  Latin  American
dummy  falls  slightly,  but  remains  significant,  a  hint  that  trade  performance  is
part  of  what  distinguishes  this  area.  Otherwise,  the  results  from  Table  6  are  very
elose  to  those  from  Table  5.
In  the  estimates  of  equation  13  reported  in  Tables  5  and  6,  the  theory
suggests  that  measures  of  labor  force  growth  and  growth  in  human  capital  should
enter  as  well.  Attempts  to  find  an  effect  using  (admitted  weak)  proxies  for  these29
variables  were  not  successful.  Population  growth  was  used  as  a  proxy  for  labor
force  growth,  but it  did not have any significant  explanatory  power either  for  the
investment share  i  or for  the growth rate  of GDP. Presumably there  is much  room
to  improve  on  this  variable,  but  there  is  a  limit  to  what  can  be  done  given  the
vague  distinction  between  being  in  and  out  of  the  labor  force  in  less  developed
countries.  At  a minimum,  the  working  age  population  would  be  an  improvement.
Attempts to use measures of changes in human  capital  per capita  were
similarly  unsuccessful.  There is  some  indication  that  a  measure  of the  change  in
the rate  of  literacy  was positively  related  to  the  share of  investment.  The
estimated  effect  is  relatively  large,  implying that  a 10%  improvement  in literacy
is  associated  with  a .5%  increase  in  i,  but  the  coefficient  is  not  precisely
estimated,  (t=1.8).  The  change  in  literacy  had  no  independent  effect  on  growth
when  it  was  entered  in  the  regressions  reported  in  Tables  5  and  6.
Table  7  reports  the  results  oI attempts  to  make  use  of  data  on  scientists  and
engineers  to  identify  further  instances  of  variation  in  the  growth  rate  of  the
technology.  Because  of  data  limitations,  the  resulting  sample  consists  of  only  22
of  the  most  developed  countries,  and  the  initial  measurement  for  the  number  of
scientists  is  from  1970  rather  than  1960.  (See  Table  8  for  a  list  of  the  countries
in  this  sample.)  In  this  admittedly  very  small  sample,  nothing  had  any  explanatory
power  for the  investment share  i.  In the growth regression,  both  the  (natural
logarithm  of) the number  of scientists  and the  change in the  number  of scientists
are correlated  with growth.  The log transformation  fit  the data  much  better  than
the  levels  or the numbers  of per capita.
The theory suggests  that  for  a closed economy, it  is the  total  stock of human
capital  that  matters  for  rate  of growth of  A and the  rate  of growth of output.  The
findings  here are consistent  with the  interpretation  that  because of
transportation  or  other  transactions  costs,  these  economies  are  still  only3$)
partially  integrated,  and  that  the  local  rate  of  growth  of  A,  and  therefore  the
local  inputs  into  the  rate  of  growth  of  A,  still  matters  more  that  what  is
happening  worldwide.  Because  of  the  logarithm  transformation,  the  a  coefficient
of  .05  on  SCI_DIFF  implies  than  a  doubling  of  scientists  over  the  period  is
associated  with  an  increase  in  the  marginal  product  of  capital  of  around  3.5x.
Th.s  regression  also  offers  some  indication  of  the  presence  of  an
interaction  between  trade  growth  ris  the  allocation  of  resources  to  a  research
sector.  If  the  Interaction  term  with  SCI_DIFF  is  excluded  from  the  regression,
the interaction  term with the growth  In the export share (EX_DIFF)  has a t-
statistic  greater than 2.  When  both terms are present that  Is at best weak  evidence
of an effect  of growth in trade that  is separate from  the other effects.  Also, in
this  sample,  there  is  only  weak  evidence  of  the  negative  effect  of  AVG_Y  on  the
marginal  product  of  capital  that  was  identified  earlier.  This  is  matched  by  the
finding  noted  above  that  no  vsziable,  not  even  AVG_Y,  has  any  statistically
significant  explanatory  power  for  i  in this  very small sample.
6.  Comparisons  with  other  results
As  noted  in  the  beginning,  there  is  a  great  deal  of  evidence  on  cross  country
correlations  between  growth  and  a  variety  of  other  variables.  Some  of  the  studies
approaching  this  question  from  the  point  of  view  of  development  economics  are
summarized  in  Chapter  1  of  Chenery,  Robinson,  and  Syrquin  (1986.)  Studies  that
have  approached  the  question  from  the  perspective  of  trade  theory  and  the  effects
of  liberalization  are  summarized  in  Edwards  (1989j.  Two  very  robust  conclusions
emerge  from  these  studies.  First,  the  investment  share  has  an  estimated
coefficient  that  is  generally  between  .1  and  .2  that  is  highly  significant.  It
is  almost  always  the  variable  with  the  most  explanatory  power  in  such  equations.31
The  second  finding  is  that  some  measure  of  openness,  usually  export  growth,
is  correlated  with  growth  as  well.  Edwards  (1989)  is  an  exception  that  uises
instead  a  measure  of  deviations  from  predicted  trade  patterns  based  on  a  Iecsher-
Olin  model.  Like  export  growth,  it  has  a  sigpficant,  positive,  partial
correlation  with  growth.  Edwards  makes  a  strong  case  for  greater  precision  in  the
definition  of  what  we  mean  by  openness  or  liberalization  and  for  attempts  to
develop  better  cross  country  measures  of  these  concepts  for  use  in  studies  such  as
this.  The  trade-off  in  such  cases  is  that  the  use  of  more  sophisticated  measures  of
openness  is  likely  to  restrict  the  sample  of  countries  that  can  be  considered
because  of  data  limitations.
Moreover,  enough  evidence  has  already  accumulated  liaking  openness  with
higher  growth  that  it  is  highly  tnlikely  that  a  refined  measure  will  overturn  this
basic  finding.  Rather,  refinements  are  likely  to  be  important  for  refining  the
question  that  is  asked,  for  example,  to  ask  as  Edwards  does  whether  it  it  a  rapid
rate  of  growth  of  exports  that  matters  for  growth  or  instead  a  policy  of
nonintervention  in  international  trade.  Both  for  addressing  these  more  refined
questions  and  for  bringing  other  evidence  to  bear  on  the  question  of  causality,  a
some  kind  of  theory  that  links  technological  change  and  exports  is  required.
Given  the  previous  findings,  the  finding  here  that  investment  and  trade
performance  are  correlated  with  growth  is  not  a  surprise.  What  is  new  is  the
systematic  attempt  to  place  these  findings  in  the  context  of  a  theory  that  makes  it
possible  to  consider  the  causal  connections  between  technological  change,
invesment,  trade  performance  and  growth.  For  example,  the  finding  here  that  the
share of exports,  not the  change in the  share,  has explanatory  power in a
regression  for  the  investment  share,  but  does  not  have  any  significant  relation
with  the  marginal  product  of  capital,  is  a  potentially  revealing  result  that  has
been  missed  in  regressions  of  growth  on  investment  and  other  variables.  Combined32
with  the  contrasting  finding  that  investment  is  increasing  in  the  level  of  income
and  that  the  marginal  product  of  capital  is  strongly  negatively  related  to  the
level  of  income,  this  result  offers  support  for  a  direct  link  between
technological  change  and  openness.  There  have  been  attempts  to  relate  growth  to
measures  of  human  capital  accumulation  like  school  enrollement  rates.  For
example,  Barro  (1989b)  finds  that  these  measures  have  explanatory  power  for  the
investment  rate  but  not  for  growth  of  GDP  in  an  equation  that  includes  the
investment  rate.  The  evidence  presented  appears  to  be  the  first  cross  country
evidence  supporting  the  idea  that  scientists  and  engineers  are  important  inputs  in
the  sector  that  produces  technological  change.
The  fact  that  the  initial  level  of  income  has  a  negative  effect  on  growth
rates  in  a  regression  analysis  that  holds  invesment  constant  has  been  demonstrated
before.  See  Barro  (1989a,  1989b).  Romer  (1989)  raises  concern  about  the
possibility  that  this  effect  may  arise  largely  because  of  measurement  error  in  a
regression  that  has  the  differnce  in  the  levels  of  income  on  the  left  hand  side  and
the  intital  level  of  income  on  the  right  hand  side.  This  is  why  the  analysis  here
uses  the  average  level  of  income  intead  of  the  initial  level.
Barro  (1989a)  decomposes  investment  into  government  and  private  components
and  finds  that  the  effects  on  output  of  the  two  kinds  of  invesment  are  similar.  He
also  finds  that  higher  public  goods  investment  is  associated  with  higher  private
goods  investment.  Barro  (1989b)  uses  a  measure  of  deviations  from  purchasing
power  parity  for  investment  goods  as  an  index  of  distortions,  and  finds  that  it  is
negatively  related  to  growth.  Since  he  does  not  include  trade  variables,  it  is  not
possible  to  tell  whether  this  is  capturing  the  effect  of  a  different  distortion
from  the  effect  picked  up  by  the  trade  variables,  or  is  an  independent  measure  of
openness.
There  are  other  correlations  that  have  been  identified.  For  example,33
Kormendi  and  NeGuire  (1985)  find  that  in  a  sample  of  46  countries,  both  the  rate  of
inflation  and the  standard  deviation  of the  rate  of growth of the money  supply have
negative  coefficients  in a regression  equation for the  growth rate.  They  also  find
postive  effect  for  a  measure  of  civil  liberty.  Barro  (1989a,b)  finds  negative
effect  for  measures  of  war  and  revolution.  Londregan  and  Poole  (1989)  find  a
signnificant  relationship  between  coups  d'etat  and  reduced  growth.
This  last  analysis  is  unusual  in  the  sense  that  itiexplicitly  allows  for  two
way  causality;  because  of  the  discrete  nature  of  a  coup,  they  can  use  an  event  study
methodology  to  study both economic  performance leading up to a coup and  subsequent
performance.  They  find  that  the probability  of a coup decreases  significantly
with increases  in economic  well being,  and  that  economic  growth  is  lower  and
political  instability  higher after  a coup.
The  problem  for  interpreting  all  of  this  evidence  is  that  of  establishing
causality.  Even  in  the  Londregan  and  Poole  study  that  relies  on  timing  evidence  is
susceptible  to  multiple  interpretations.  It  could  be  that  coops  cause  slower
subsequent  growth,  or  that  the  factors  that  lead  to  low  growth  are  persistent,  and
that  all  of  the  causality  runs  from  economic  performance  to  political  events.
Until  more  detailed  theory  helps  us  corroborate  the  possible  causal  channels  with
other  kinds  of  data,  these  effects  are  likely  to  continue  to  be  difficult  to
interpret.
7. Conclhsions
Taken  together,  the  evidence  provided  here  suggests  that  the  rate  of  growth
technological  change  exhibits  more  systematic  variation  with  economic  variables
and  more  variation  across  countries  than  than  one  might  previously  have  suspected.34
This  finding  is  very  important  for  the  interpretation  of  the  finding  that  the  rate
of  investment  is  highly  correlated  with  the  rate  of  growth.  Under  the  plausible
presumption  that  the  rate  of  technological  change  does  not  vary  much  across
countries,  the  correlation  between  investment  and  growth  seems  to  offer  evidence
against  diminishing  returns  to  capital  accumulation.  (Prior  to  the  analysis
undertaken  here,  this  line  of  argument  seemed  persuasive  to  the  author.)
The  evidence  here  uiWermines  the  presumption  that  the  rate  of  technological
change  is  roughly  the  same  across  countries.  Much  of  the  variation  in  the  rate  of
investment  may  indeed  be  caused  by  variation  in  the  rate  of  growth  of  the
technology.  This  removes  a  presumption  that  the  correlation  between  investment
and  growth  reflects  causality  from  invesment  to  technological  change.  The  finding
that  investment  is  increasing  with  the  level  of  development  and  rates  of  return  are
descreasing  offers  additional  direct  evidence  that  diminishing  returns  to  capital
accumulation  may  be  an  important  factor.
From  the  point  of  view  of  policies  designed  to  foster  growth  in  less
developed  countries,  this  results  cuts  two  ways.  On  the  one  hand,  the  finding  that
less  developed  countries  have  a  higher  rate  of  return  to  capital,  and  implicitly
that  capital  is  relatively  scarce  there,  buttresses  the  conventional  rationale  for
international  lending.  There  appear  to  be  static  output  gains  that  can  be  had  by
shifting  some  investment  from  developed  to  less  developed  countries.  On  the  other
hand,  the  results  here  suggest  that  international  lending  probably  will  not  have  a
large  effect  on  long  term  growth  rates.
If  the  theory  and  the  inferences  drawn  here  are  correct,  the  key  determinant
of  the  growth  rate  in  less  developed  countries  is  the  rate  of  expansion  of
investment  opportunities.  Opening  a  country  to  increased  trade  seems  to  be  one  way
to  increase  these  opportunities,  in  part  because  it  allows  for  the  purchase  of  the
broad  range  of  highly  developed  producer  inputs  available  world  wide.  Another  way35
may  be  to  encourage  the  development  of  the  scientific  talent  for  the  production  of
new  goods  and  new  investment  opportunities  domestically,  but  one  should  be  careful
about  generalizing  the  results  here  for  scientists  too  far  beyond  the  sample  of
relatively  developed  countries  in  which  it  is  identified.  There  results  here  also
offer  a  suggestions  that  controlling  the  size  of  the  government,  and  reducing  tax
and  other  distortions  in  private  markets,  may  be  important  in  encouraging  growth.
In  closing,  it  is  useful  to  use  the  numbers  from  the  regressions  to  indicate
the  relative  magnitude  of  the  growth  and  level  effects  just  decribed.  For
Argentina,  the  implied  coefficient  for  invesment  from  Table  6,  that  is  the  implied
rate  of  return  for  capital,  is  about  11%,  a  representative  figure  for  Latin  America
countries.  (If  the  dummy  variable  for  Latin  America  is  entered  as  an  interaction
term  with  the  investment  share  instead  of  as  a  direct  effect  on  growth  rates,  the
rate  of  return  for  Argentina  falls  to  around  8%..)  The  effect  of  additional  foreign
lending  designed  to  take  advantage  of  the  higher  rate  of  return  on  capital  in
Argentrina  than  in  the  rest  of  the  world  can  be  calculated  as  follows.  Suppose  that
the  additional  lending  is  equal  to  1%  of  GDP,  and  all  of  it  is  devoted  to  new
investment,  with  no  offsetting  reduction  in  investment  by  private  individuals.  If
the  real  rate  of  interest  is  37  and  the  depreciation  rate  on  capital  is  3%,  the
net  increase  in  GDP  is  (117%-37,-3X)*(17,)  = 0.77.  of  GDP  per  year.
This  can  be  contrasted  with  the  effect  of  a  one  percent  increase  in  the  share
of  exports  as  a  percent  of  GDP.  Over  the  last  25  years,  the  investment  share  for
Argentina  has  averaged  around  20%.  The  coeffcient  of  .004  on  the  interaction  term
between  the  increase  in  the  export  share  and  the  investment  share  implies  that  a
planned  increase  in  the  export  share  of  .01,  spread  over  a  20  year  period,  will
lead  to  .004  increase  in  the  rate  of  return  on  investment.  Assuming  that  this
effect  applies  only  to  new  investment,  output  will  increase  by  (.004)*(20%)  = .87
of  GDP.  According  to  Table  3,  the  increase  in  the  export  share  should  ultimately36
lead  to  a  small  increase  in  the  investment  share  as  well.  This  is  in  contrast  to
the  increase  in  foreign  lending,  that  may  have  the  effect  of  reducing  rates  of
return  and  partially  crowding  out  existing  investment  spending.
Thus,  even  in  terms  of  the  impact  effects,  policies  designed  to  encourage
openness  may  have  effects  comparable  in  magnitude  to  the  effects  of  additional
lending  designed  to  take  advantage  of  rate  of  return  differentials.  Over  time,  the
growth  effect  induced  by  the  increase  in  openness  will  strongly  dominate  the  level
effect  from  additional  borrowing.  The  level  effect  leads  to  a  constant  flow  of  .77,
of additional  GDP  per year.  As new  investment takes  place each year,  the growth or
rate  of return  effect  of  addtional  accumulates,  with  a  .008%  increase  in  the  first
year,  .008+.008%  in the second year,  etc.
The  implied  standard  errors  for  these  calculations  are  quite  large,  and  the
specific  numbers  should  be  taken  only  as  indications  of  orders  of  magnitude.  But
if  the  general  conclusions  of  the  analysis  here  are  correct,  policies  like  a  move
toward  greater  openness  may  have  cummulative  effects  that  are  very  large  compared
to-standard  policies  designed  to  mitigate  capital  scarcity.  The  same  conclusion
might  equally  well  be  applied  to  reductions  in  distortions,  but  the  support  for  the
effects  of  distortions  on  growth  rates  is  at  present  somewhat  tenuous.37
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1988.Table  1.  Variable  Definitions:
i  Share  of  inivestment  in  GDP.  Average  value  of  the  variable  ci for
from  RS  for  the  years  1960-85.
Growth  Average  annual  rate  of  change  of  RGDP2  from  HS,  1960-85.
AVG3Y  Average  value  of  real  income,  1960-85,  in  1980  US$.  RGDP2  from  HS-
GOV  Share  of  non-investment  government  spending  in  GDP.  Average  value
of cg 'rom HS.
AVG-EX  Average  share  of  exports  in  GDP.  From  the  World  Bank.
EXODIFF Export share  in  GDP  for  years  1981-85  minus share  for  the  years
1960-64.  World Bank.
AF DUM  Dummy  variable  for  countries  in  Africa.
LA_DUN  Dummy  variable  for  Latin  American,  that  is,  South  America,  Central
America,  and  Mexico
SCI70  Logrithm  of  the  number  of  scientists,  and  engineers  employed  in  R&D
for  years  around  1970.  From  UNESCO  (1972).
SCIDIFF  Difference  in  the  logarithm  of  the  total  number  of  scientists
between the  years  1970 and  1985.  From  UNESCO  (1972,  1986).
Growth rate  and share  variables  measured in  percent  *100.  (See  Table  2
for  descriptive  statistics  for  the  variables.)  HS  refers  to  Heston  Summers
(1988).  All  averages  are  taken  over  the  years  1960  to  1985  unless  indicated
otherwise.  For  the  variables  SCI70 and  SCI  DIFF,  a trunction  rule  was used  to
remove  from  the  sample  countries  that  had  very  small  numbers  of  scientists  and
engineers.  The  resulting  list  of  countries  is  reported  in  Table  8.
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Table  2.  Descriptive  statistics
Number  of  countries:  112
Series  Mean  S.D.  aximum  Minium
i  14.797229 6.4061605 29.113850 2.9930770
GROWTH  1.9553791 1.9564617 6.6401340  -2.8898990
Number  of  countries:  90
Series  Mean  S.D.  Maximum  Minimum
i  14.967188 6.4236602 29.113850 4.1057690
GROWTH  1.8184393 1.8576269 6.3931320  -2.8898990
AVG  Y  2838.1538 2744.0510 9985.8080 289.92310
coV-  15.827137 5.3758415 31.088850 4.0023080
EX  DIFF  4.2248946 14.987000 34.257690  -49.197690
AVG  EX  0.2770491 0.1614817 0.8545491 0.0510950
Number  of  countries:  22
Series  Mean  S.D.  Maximum  Minimum
GROWTH  3.0094120  1.2517190  5.7479920  0.4096714
i  20.724458 3.7639637 29.113850 13.643850
GOV  14.353934 5.4558241 31.088850 6.6923080
SCI70  9.3231164 2.1063328 13.216580 5.6733230
SCI  DIFF  0.6142574 0.5324369 1.7416300  -0.8944078
EX UIFF  15.527562 7.7671210 34.257690 4.9030120
AVG  EX  0.2480606 0.1166470 0.4609159 0.0914310
AVG-Y  6331.6189 2197.9358 9985.8080 1638.5770
=======  =======  ======  =======  =__===  =====__  __===,  ___=__=  ======40
Table  3.
LS  1/  Dependent  Variable  is  GROWTH
Number  of  observations:  112
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STD.  ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIC.
C  -0.6865793  0.3806635  -1.8036384 0.075
i  0.1785441 0.0236245 7.5575699 0.000
R-squared  0.341778  Mean  of  dependent  var  1.955379
Adiusted  R-squared  0.335794  S.D.  of  dependent  var  1.956462
S.i.  of  regression 1.594493  Sum  of  squared  resid  279.6650
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.831269  F-statistic  57.11686
Log  likelihood  -210.1664
Notes:  Least  squares  regression  of  growth  rates  on  investment.  Full  Summers-
Reston  sample.41
Table  4
LS  1/  Dependent  Variable  is  i
Number  of  observations:  90
…===================_===========================____=___--------
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STD.  ERROR  i-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIG.
C  7.9921210 1.0685418 7.4794653 0.000
AVG  Y  0.0013847 0.0001841 7.5215358 0.000
AVG-EX  0.1099152 0.0312828 3.5135998 0.001
R-squared  0.472971  Mean  of  dependent  var 14.96719
Adjusted  R-squared  0.460856  S.D.  of  dependent  var 6.423660
S.E.  of  regression 4.716665  Sum  of  squared  resid  1935.483
Durbin-Watson  stat  2.233394  F-statistic  39.03821
Log  likelihood  -265.7781
Notes:  Least  squares  regression  of  investment  share  on  level  of  income  and
average  export  share.  Sample  with  trade  data.42
Table  5
LS  /Dependent  Variable  is  GROWTH
Number  of  observations:  90
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT  STD.  ERROR  T-STAT. 2-TAIL  SIG.
C  1.5007432  0.6644834  2.2585112  0.027
i  0.2159812  0.0355887  6.0688194  0.000
i*AVG  Y  -3.240E-05  1.200E-05 -2.6999165  0.009
AVG  Y  0.0003994  0.0002414  1.6547624  0.102
i*EX  IIFF  0.0011491  0.0004971  2.3116570  0.024
AF  DUM  -1.3552696  0.4212235 -3.2174599  0.002
LA  DUM  -1.3078399  0.4089565 -3.1979924  0.002
GOV  -0.1059372  0.0288536 -3.6715428  0.000
R-squared  0.584176 Mean  of  dependent  var  1.818439
Adusted  R-squared  0.548678 S.D.  of  dependent  var  1.857627
S. 3 . of  regression  1.247963 Sum  of  squared  resid  127.7077
Durbin-Watson  stat  2.038543 F-statistic  16.45695
Log  likelihood  -143.4515
Notes:  Least  squares  regression  of  growth  rates  on  investment,  level  of
income,  and  interaction  terms  with  investment.  Sample  with  trade  data.43
Table  6
TSLS  //  Dependent  Variable  is  GROWTH
Nur;'er  of  observations:  90
Instrument  list:  C i  i*AVG  Y AVG  Y  AF  DUM  LA  DUK  GOV  EEC  EFTA  WB1
WB2  WB3  WB4  WB5  WB6  WB7
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT  STD.  ERROR  T-STAT. 2-TAIL  SIG.
c  1.3291252  0.7878811  1.6869617  0.096
i  0.2195068  0.0419658  5.2306159  0.000
i*AVG  Y  -3.278E-05  1.414E-05 -2.3183639  0.023
AVG  V  0.0002961  0.0002894  1.0233960  0.310
i*EX JIFF  0.0039522  0.0015720  2.5141259  0.014
AF WUM  -1.4148416  0.4971947 -2.8456493  0.006
LA  DUM  -1.0175087  0.5049148 -2.0152088  0.048
uOV  -0.0945953  0.0345000 -2.7418903  0.008
R-squared  0.422907 Mean  of  dependent  var  1.818439
Adusted  R-squared  0.373643 S.D.  of  dependent  var  1.857627
S.E.  of  regression  1.470176 Sum  of  squared  resid  177.2363
Durbin-Watson  stat  2.266644 F-statistic  8.584498
Log  likelihood  -158.1998
Notes:  Two  stage  least  squares  regression  of  growth  rates  on  investment,
level  of  income,  and  interaction  terms.  Change  in  exports  (EX  DIFF)  treated
as  endogenous  or  measured  with  error.  Sample  with  trade  data.-  Additional
intruments  are  dummy  variables  indicating  membership  in  a  trade  union  (EEC  and
EFTA)  and  indicators  of  degree  of  openess  for  devploping  countries  reported  in
the  1987  World  Development  Report  (WB1-WB7).44
Table  7
Panel  A:
LS  //  Dependent  Variab  e  is  GROWTH
Number  of  observations.  22
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STD.  ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIG.
C  0.9979581 1.1848868 0.8422392 0.412
i  -0.0392770 0.0697337  -0.5632424 0.581
i*AVG  Y  -7.866E-06 5.542E-06  -1.4194179 0.175
i*SCI7O 0.0130618 0.0052966 2.4660435 0.025
i*SCI  DIFF 0.0529528 0.0182842 2.8960965 0.011
i*EX_IIFF  0.0021432 0.0014871 1.4412136 0.169
R-squared  0.569331  Mean  of  dependent  var 3.009412
Ad'usted  R-squared  0.434748  S.D.  of  dependent  var  1.251719
S.E.  of  regression 0.941083  Sum  of  squared  resid  14.17020
Durbin-Watson  stat  2.554860  F-statistic  4.230308
Log  likelihood  -26.37774
Panel  B:
Series  Mean  S.D.  Maximum  Minimum
i_COEF  0.0984995  0.0434956  0.2245623  -0.0135211
Notes:
Panel  A: Least  squares  regression  of  growth  rates  on  investment,  level  of
income,  and  interaction  terms  with  investment.  Sample  with  trade  and
scientific  data.  (See  Table  8  for  a  list  of  the  countries.)
Panel  B: Descriptive  statistics  for  the  coefficient  on  investment  predicted
by  the  estimates  in  Panel  A.45
Table  8.  Countries  with  data  for  scientists  and  engineers
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